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The right to freedom of expres-
sion is essential for the protection 
of rights in the Americas. It is easy 
to understand that denouncing vi-
olations of human and civil rights 
would not be possible without the 
ability to exercise the right to free 
expression, especially the right to 
free speech. But, the importance of 
the right to freedom of expression 
goes well beyond. In fact, it can also 
help prevent mass and gross viola-
tions of human rights by bringing 
society’s attention to initial, iso-
lated rights violations that, if not 
properly addressed, could become 
a slippery slope, leading to the de-
struction of democratic values.
There is a constant need for assess-
ment and evaluation in all demo-
cratic societies. Democracy is per-
fectible, and ensuring a vigorous, 
vibrant debate of human rights 
is an essential mechanism for im-
provement. It is necessary that 
these debates focus on traditional 
areas of weakness within democ-
racies, such as the improvement 
of administration of justice and 
protection against discrimination. 
Additionally, in an ever-changing 
world, there is also need to address 
new challenges, like the scope of 
privacy in a world facing profound 
technological development and the 
eradication of corruption amidst 
the challenges created by new 
forms of criminality.
This article examines the role the 
Inter-American System has played 
in protecting the right to freedom 
of expression; and, in particular the 
interpretation of the relevant pro-
visions of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Ameri-
can Declaration on Human Rights 
by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. In analyzing this 
field, it is critical to understand it is 
an area of constant evolution with 
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ever emerging new challenges. 
What remains constant is the value 
of the normative process identified 
in the Inter-American System. This 
process relies upon the superviso-
ry organs and their jurisprudence 
to secure a realization of the right 
to freedom of expression that gives 
full effect to its scope and crucial 
role in protecting the exercise of 
every other right in a democratic 
society.
I. Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Expression in 
the Inter-American System
The right to freedom of expression 
in the Inter-American System is 
regulated by Articles 13 and 14 of 
the American Convention,2 as well 
as by Article 4 of the American 
Declaration.3 This paper focuses on 
protection of the right to freedom 
of expression under the American 
Convention. Several factors, how-
ever, have led to the emergence of 
a unified legal regime on the right 
to freedom of expression under 
both the American Convention 
and the American Declaration. 
This is partly due to the fact that 
the Convention elaborates on the 
content of human rights obliga-
tions laid down by the American 
Declaration, including the right to 
freedom of expression. In addition, 
the interpretations and scope of 
this right under both documents 
are conducted by the same organ, 
i.e., the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights. As a result, 
a unified regime has emerged.
A. The Scope of Freedom of 
Expression
Subsection 1 of Article 13 of the 
American Convention establishes 
the right of individuals to think 
and express themselves freely.4 It 
also details what freedom of ex-
pression means - “to seek, receive, 
and impart information and ideas 
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers” 
- and emphasizes that the medium 
used is irrelevant, as expression can 
be communicated “either orally, 
in writing, in print, in the form of 
art, or through any other medium 
of one’s choice.”5
The jurisprudence of the Commis-
sion and the Court interprets the 
right to freedom of expression as 
prohibiting prior censorship and 
authorizing only the subsequent 
imposition of liability, except in 
exceptional situations laid down 
by Article 13 (4) for the moral 
protection of young people.6 It has 
also established the scope of per-
missible restrictions of this right 
that may apply in emergency situa-
tions.7 All forms of speech are pro-
tected by the right to freedom of 
expression, including speech that 
is offensive, shocking, or disturb-
ing to the state or other groups.8 
The Inter-American System has 
found that freedom of expression 
includes the right to denounce hu-
man rights violations by public of-
ficials.9 This highlights the connec-
tion between the Inter-American 
System’s role in protecting speech 
and guaranteeing access to justice, 
which are both crucial to the fight 
against impunity.10
The Inter-American System has 
also identified three different types 
of specially protected speech,11 
which include:
A. political speech and speech invol-
ving matters of public interest;
B. speech regarding public officials 
in the exercise of their duties and 
candidates for public office;
C. speech that is an element of the 
identity or personal dignity of 
the person expressing herself.
These forms of specially protected 
speech demonstrate the connection 
existing between speech and democ-
racy; they encourage vibrant de-
bate. Candidates and public officials 
should be subject to more public and 
“The jurisprudence of 
the Commission and the 
Court interprets the right to 
freedom of expression as 
prohibiting prior censorship 
and authorizing only the 
subsequent imposition of 
liability, except in exceptional 
situations”
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voter scrutiny because they chose to 
enter into the public domain. The 
effort to protect speech that is con-
nected to identity is intended to pro-
tect vulnerable groups, highlighting 
the fact that democracy is strength-
ened when everyone in society is 
heard and counts. These categories 
of speech are particularly relevant 
in balancing different factors when 
assessing liability. Both the Com-
mission and Court have repeatedly 
affirmed that in the Inter-American 
System there is a strong connection 
between the right to freedom of ex-
pression and democracy.12
The interpretative work of the 
Commission and the Court has 
resulted in the following character-
istics of the scope of freedom of ex-
pression within the context of the 
Inter-American System:
A. special dual character;
B. indivisibility of expression and 
dissemination of ideas;
C. multiplicity of forms of expres-
sion;
D. protection of the means required 
to disseminate ideas;
E. protection of reproduction of 
expression;
F. exclusion of direct and indirect 
restrictions; and
G. incompatibility of public and pri-
vate monopolies in information 
media with the right to freedom 
of expression.
1. Special Dual Character
Freedom of expression possesses a 
special dual character in that it not 
only involves the right of individ-
uals to express themselves, but also 
the right to receive information and 
ideas.13 Thus, as the Court explains 
in its Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, 
a violation of the right to freedom 
of expression not only infringes on 
an individual right, but also on “a 
collective right to receive any in-
formation whatsoever and to have 
access to the thoughts expressed by 
others.”14
The Court advanced this interpre-
tation in the case The Last Tempta-
tion of Christ, where it held “free-
dom of expression is a way of 
exchanging ideas and information 
between persons; it includes the 
right to try and communicate one’s 
point of view to others, but it also 
implies everyone’s right to know 
opinions, reports, and news.”15
The Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru 
case expands on this dual charac-
ter. The case was initiated when 
the Peruvian government deprived 
the majority shareholder and di-
rector of the Peruvian television 
channel Frecuencia Latina-Canal 2 
(Latin Frequency-Channel 2) of his 
Peruvian nationality. The govern-
ment’s action was in retaliation for 
the channel’s broadcast of various 
reports of human rights violations 
committed by the Fujimori regime 
in Peru during 1990-2000.16
Because foreigners could not own 
television or radio stations in Peru, 
the removal of Ivcher-Bronstein’s 
Peruvian citizenship resulted in his 
forced withdrawal from the direc-
torship of the channel. The new 
owners fired the journalists who 
produced the programs and ceased 
the broadcast of negative news 
about the regime.17 While litigating 
this case, the Commission asserted 
that the social character of the right 
to freedom of expression was much 
broader than its individual aspects; 
it protects all those who seek out 
and receive information or opin-
ions emitted by the media.18 In this 
case, the Commission argued, and 
the Court upheld, that all of society 
is victimized when an individual’s 
freedom of expression is violated.19
The Commission has had sever-
al opportunities to discuss this 
characteristic further. In the case 
of Martorell v. Chile, where cen-
sorship of the book Impunidad 
Diplomática (Diplomatic Impuni-
ty) was at issue, the Commission as-
serted that, “arbitrary interference 
that infringes this right affects not 
just the individual right to express 
information and ideas but also the 
right of the community as a whole 
to receive information and ideas of 
all kinds.”20
The Commission expanded upon 
this interpretation in Oropeza v. 
Mexico. In this case, a Mexican jour-
nalist was allegedly assassinated for 
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criticizing government authorities 
in his newspaper column, which 
included references to links be-
tween the police and drug traffick-
ing.21 The Commission affirmed 
that freedom of expression is a 
universal legal concept in which 
individuals are able to express, 
transmit, receive, and disseminate 
thoughts.22 Accordingly, both the 
Commission and the Court have 
consistently reaffirmed the dual 
character of the right of freedom of 
expression.
Unfortunately, the most brutal 
form of silencing freedom of ex-
pression, the killing of journalists, 
continues to exist in the region. 
According to the most recent re-
port of the Special Rapporteur of 
Freedom of Expression, 22 jour-
nalists and other media workers 
were killed in 2017, and several 
others were disappeared or dislo-
cated.23 The Special Rapporteur ex-
pressed concern that these acts of 
violence against journalists had a 
chilling effect on both the individ-
ual reporting of journalists that felt 
threatened and entire media out-
lets that chose to abandon cover-
age or avoid sensitive areas.24 This 
chilling effect can produce zones 
of silence and ultimately result in 
an under-informed public. These 
“zones of silence” would seem to 
undermine the “collective right to 
receive any information” expound-
ed in Advisory Opinion OC-05/85.
2. Indivisibility of Expression 
and Dissemination of Ideas
In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, 
the Court defined the scope of in-
divisibility of expression and dis-
semination, stating: “restrictions 
that are imposed on dissemination 
represent . . . a direct limitation on 
the right to express oneself free-
ly.”25 Furthermore, it asserted the 
importance of the legal rules appli-
cable to the press derives from this 
concept.26 Finally, it added that “[f]
or the average citizen it is just as 
important to know the opinions of 
others or to have access to informa-
tion generally as is the very right to 
impart his own opinions.”27
The Court had an opportunity to 
expand on this issue in Palamara 
Iribarne v. Chile. In that case, the 
Chilean government seized and 
destroyed all hard and electronic 
copies of the book Ethics and In-
telligence Services and prohibited 
its distribution.28 The Court held 
that, in guaranteeing the right to 
freedom of expression, the State 
must not only protect the individ-
ual expression itself, but also its 
dissemination “through whichever 
appropriate medium.”29
The Commission took an analo-
gous approach in Martorell v. Chile, 
where it stated that “the decision to 
ban the entry, circulation, and dis-
tribution of the book Impunidad 
Diplomática in Chile violates the 
right to impart information and 
ideas of all kinds,”30 protected un-
der the right to freedom of expres-
sion.
Similarly, in Miranda v. Mexico, the 
Commission found the failure to 
investigate and punish the master-
mind behind the assassination of 
a journalist constituted an illegal 
interference with the right of ev-
ery citizen to “receive information 
freely and to learn the truth about 
the events that took place.”31 In this 
case, the co-director of a Mexican 
weekly publication was assassinated 
for authoring and publishing opin-
ions critical of the government.32 
As these cases demonstrate, the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-Ameri-
can System has strongly upheld the 
indivisibility of expression and dis-
semination of ideas.
3. Multiplicity of Forms of 
Expression
The right to freedom of expression 
is not limited to verbal expression; 
all types of expression are protect-
ed, including silence.33 This right 
also extends to expression in the 
form of protest.34
The Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Republic 
of Argentina case is an example of 
the broad scope of the right to free-
dom of expression developed by 
the Inter-American jurisprudence. 
In 1976, the Argentine military 
dictatorship promulgated Decree 
No. 1867/76, which prohibited 
the public exercise of the Jehovah’s 
Witness religion in Argentina.35 
The government alleged that this 
religion was based on principles 
contrary to the Argentine nation-
ality and basic State institutions.36 
“The right to freedom of 
expression is not limited to 
verbal expression; all types 
of expression are protected, 
including silence. This right 
also extends to expression in 
the form of protest.”
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As a result of the decree, follow-
ers of the religion were persecut-
ed.37 More than 300 children were 
expelled from school after being 
accused of refusing to swear alle-
giance to the country or to sing 
the Argentine National Anthem.38 
The students opted instead for si-
lence because their religion prohib-
ited them from engaging in such 
veneration of national symbols.39 
Pursuant to Resolution No. 02/79, 
the Commission condemned of the 
Argentine government’s action, 
which it considered to be responsi-
ble for the alleged violations.40
As exemplified by the Commis-
sion’s resolution in the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses case, all forms of expres-
sion, including silence, are pro-
tected under the right to freedom 
of expression. With this in mind, 
the attention drawn to the issue of 
unlawful quelling or regulating of 
protests in some states in the re-
gion by the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression in his lat-
est report, is very troubling. The 
Special Rapporteur received infor-
mation on dozens of detentions, 
threats, and aggressions committed 
against journalists, protesters, and 
users of social networks that re-
ported on protests.41 As the Special 
Rapporteur points out, public pro-
test is a critical medium of expres-
sion used by groups that are mar-
ginalized or discriminated against 
in traditional public forums.42 
Public protest is also a medium 
of expression protected under the 
American Convention.
4. Protection of the Means 
Necessary to Disseminate Ideas
Having asserted the right to dis-
seminate opinions and ideas, both 
the Commission and the Court de-
termined that the American Con-
vention provides that freedom of 
thought and expression includes 
the right to disseminate informa-
tion and ideas by any means.43 In 
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the 
Court affirmed that “freedom of 
expression ... cannot be separat-
ed from the right to use whatev-
er medium is deemed appropriate 
to impart ideas and to have them 
reach as wide an audience as pos-
sible.”44 The Commission asserted 
in its complaint in the Baruch Ivch-
er-Bronstein v. Peru case, discussed 
above, that the American Con-
vention consecrates the right to 
disseminate information and ideas 
in an artistic form or by any other 
means.45
Protection of the right to dissemi-
nate ideas was recently addressed in 
the latest report of the Special Rap-
porteur of Freedom of Expression 
where he stressed that regulations 
on use of the internet needed to be 
carefully calculated. The internet 
clearly has a vast potential for ex-
pression, dissemination, and con-
sumption of ideas. Accordingly, the 
Special Rapporteur recommended 
that in evaluating the proportion-
ality of restrictions of freedom of 
expression on the internet, “the im-
pact that said restriction could have 
on the capacity of the internet to 
guarantee and promote freedom of 
expression must be weighed against 
the benefits that restriction would 
provide for the protection of oth-
er interests.”46 Furthermore, it is 
important to stress the “benefits” 
restrictions could provide must 
remain grounded in international 
law, including the American Con-
vention, and it is not enough that a 
government can claim a benefit of 
some kind to justify restrictions.
5. Protection of Reproduction of 
Information
The right to freedom of expression 
includes the right to reproduction 
of expression originating from oth-
ers. In the Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa 
“Having asserted the right 
to disseminate opinions and 
ideas, both the Commission 
and the Court determined 
that the American Convention 
provides that freedom of 
thought and expression 
includes the right to 
disseminate information and 
ideas by any means.”
“As exemplified by the 
Commission’s resolution in the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses case, all 
forms of expression, including 
silence, are protected under 
the right to freedom of 
expression. With this in mind, 
the attention drawn to the 
issue of unlawful quelling 
or regulating of protests in 
some states in the region by 
the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression in his 
latest report, is very troubling.”
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Rica case, the State convicted the 
petitioner on the criminal charge 
of defamation based on the con-
tents of several articles published 
by the newspaper La Nación.47 
These articles, which previously 
appeared in the Belgian press, at-
tributed illegal acts to Costa Rica’s 
honorary representative to the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agen-
cy in Austria.48 Costa Rican law 
required that the petitioner prove 
the veracity of the facts reported 
in the European press, and later re-
produced in La Nación, in order to 
avoid liability.49 The Court found 
this standard to be incompatible 
with Article 13 of the Convention 
and that it “has a deterrent, chilling 
and inhibiting effect on all those 
who practice journalism . . . [that] 
obstructs public debate on issues of 
interest to society.”50
Penalizing the reproduction of in-
formation originating from third 
parties, in the absence of malice or 
grave negligence, would seriously 
restrict the free flow of ideas in an 
increasingly complex global reali-
ty where information flows from 
multiple and often distant actors. 
The exclusion of liability for re-
producing this type of information 
does not, however, imply exclud-
ing liability of those with whom 
the information originated (e.g., 
malicious statements of fact) or 
the liability of those who repro-
duce such information with mal-
ice or grave negligence.51
6. Exclusion of Direct and 
Indirect Restrictions
Subsection three of Article 13 of 
the American Convention pro-
hibits restrictions on freedom of 
expression that are carried out 
by indirect means designed to im-
pede communication.52 The Spe-
cial Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression has defined indirect 
measures as those that, although 
not “designed strictly speaking 
to restrict the freedom of expres-
sion…[n]onetheless, in practice . . . 
have an adverse impact on the free 
circulation of ideas.”53 Unlike di-
rect restrictions, these are harder 
to detect and consequently, rarely 
investigated.
The Baruch Ivcher-Bronstein v. 
Peru case, discussed above, pro-
vides an example of an indirect 
restriction on freedom of expres-
sion. In this case, the government 
did not use traditional restrictions 
such as libel, contempt laws, cen-
sorship, or political persecution to 
silence Bronstein. Instead, the re-
gime stripped him of his national-
ity to achieve this goal.54
Since then, Inter-American juris-
prudence has expanded on the con-
cept of indirect restrictions. In the 
Canese v. Paraguay case, the Com-
mission recognized punitive mea-
sures as an indirect restriction to 
freedom of expression. Mr. Canese 
was a journalist who wrote about 
allegations of corruption against 
the powerful presidential candidate 
Juan Carlos Wasmosy. Canese was 
fired from the newspaper where he 
worked and criminal proceedings 
were brought against him. He was 
sentenced to four months’ impris-
onment and not allowed to leave 
Paraguay. The Commission stat-
ed that “[t]he inhibiting effect of 
the punitive measure can generate 
self-censorship of a person who 
wishes to speak out, which produc-
es almost the same effect as direct 
censorship: ‘opinions do not circu-
late.’”55 In that case, the Court de-
termined “the criminal proceeding, 
the consequent sentence imposed 
on Canese . . . and the restrictions 
to leave the country during almost 
eight years and four months consti-
tuted an indirect means of restrict-
ing his freedom of thought and 
expression.”56 Using that law to 
its fullest extent, the government 
limited “the open debate on topics 
of public interest or concern and 
restricted Canese’s exercise of free-
dom of thought and expression to 
omit his opinions for the remain-
der of the electoral campaign.”57
In a case addressing indirect restric-
tions, Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, the 
Court noted there must be an actu-
al restriction of speech in order for 
a violation to occur.58 In this case, 
the Court found the government 
of Venezuela had not violated the 
victim’s rights per se, but had failed 
its obligation to protect the victim 
from indirect restrictions by pri-
vate actors.59
For years, the Special Rapporteur 
for Freedom of Expression has also 
investigated indirect means em-
ployed to restrict this right as they 
emerge in the region, including 
government funding and tax bene-
fits for government-friendly media 
outlets, threats of withdrawal of 
required licenses and permits from 
media outlets critical of the gov-
ernment, and the creation of new 
crimes related to new media, such 
as online libel, continue to persist.
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Already in the 2003 Annual Report, 
the Rapporteur evaluated how the 
unregulated use of official publici-
ty could be transformed into a re-
striction. For example, the abuse 
of funding distribution policies to 
benefit those who favor the govern-
ment or its agents punishes those 
media agencies that seek a more 
critical approach. The Rapporteur 
illustrated that although “[t]here 
exists no inherent right to receive 
government advertising revenue. 
. . [the state] cannot deny publici-
ty income only to specific outlets 
based on discriminatory criteria.”60 
Unfortunately, this trend contin-
ues to be found in the Special Rap-
porteur’s most recent report where 
he recounts complaints pertaining 
to distribution of government ad-
vertising intended to punish or re-
ward media outlets based on their 
editorial positions.61 Furthermore, 
the 2017 Report stressed concern 
over the threatened withdrawal of 
operating concessions, permits, or 
licenses of critical media outlets.62
The Rapporteur reminded State 
authorities of their positive duty to 
build an environment of tolerance 
and respect to protect the dissemi-
nation of ideas.63 Another concern-
ing development highlighted by 
the Rapporteur is the emergence 
of new crimes indirectly restricting 
freedom of expression. One exam-
ple is the Latoya Nugent case in Ja-
maica where Nugent was arrested 
for naming alleged perpetrators of 
sexual violence on social media, in 
violation of the Cybercrimes Act.64 
The Rapporteur stressed that this 
type of double criminalization was 
inappropriate because it allows for 
aggravating circumstances relating 
only to the medium used, in this 
case social media.65
7. Incompatibility of Public 
and Private Monopolies in 
Information Media with the 
Right to Freedom of Expression
Both the Court and the Commis-
sion have confirmed the existence 
of public and private monopolies 
impedes the dissemination of indi-
vidual ideas as well as the reception 
of the opinions of others. As a re-
sult, the existence of monopolies in 
the media industry is inconsistent 
with freedom of expression. In 
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the 
Court stated that “[i]t is the mass 
media that make[s] the exercise of 
freedom of expression a reality.”66 
To ensure that this medium is not 
restricted, the Court determined 
there must be “a plurality of means 
of communication, the barring of 
all monopolies . . . and guarantees 
for the protection of the freedom 
and independence of journalists.”67
In Baruch lvcher-Bronstein v. Peru, 
the Commission affirmed that the 
free circulation of ideas is only 
conceivable where there are multi-
ple sources of information in addi-
tion to respect for the media.68 The 
Commission explained that it is 
not enough to guarantee the right 
to establish mass media; it is also 
necessary that journalists and other 
professionals working in the media 
have the protections necessary to 
ensure they can work freely and in-
dependently in this space.69
Furthermore, the Special Rappor-
teur has stated that “assignments 
of radio and television broadcast 
frequencies should consider demo-
cratic criteria that guarantee equal 
opportunities of access for all in-
dividuals.”70 In the most recent 
report of the Special Rapporteur 
of Freedom of Expression, the 
Rapporteur noted that the con-
centration of public and private 
media is still a problem in some 
countries.71 The Rapporteur noted 
specific complaints regarding the 
lack of recognition of the indige-
nous broadcasting sector in some 
countries and the absence of regu-
latory mechanisms to ensure access 
to these frequencies.72 In a further 
expansion of the right of freedom 
of expression, the Inter-Ameri-
can Court, in the case of Kimel v. 
Argentina,73 stated the “plurality 
of the media and the prohibition 
of all types of monopolies in rela-
tion thereto, whatever be the form 
they may adopt, is imperative.”74 
The Court thereby established a 
positive state obligation to adopt a 
normative framework that would 
guarantee the exclusion of monop-
olies in information media.
B. Prohibition of Prior 
Censorship
One of the principal characteristics 
of the right of freedom of expres-
sion in the Inter-American Sys-
tem is that it only allows for prior 
censorship when used to regulate 
public entertainment in order to 
safeguard the morals of children 
and adolescents.75 Subsection two 
of Article 13 of the Convention 
provides that freedom of expres-
sion cannot be subject to prior 
censorship, but “shall be subject 
to subsequent imposition of liabili-
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ty.”76 The Declaration of Principles 
holds that direct or indirect prior 
censorship restricts the free circu-
lation of ideas and opinions, which 
violates the right to freedom of ex-
pression.77
This prohibition responds to the 
danger of creating filters capable 
of determining what individuals 
can hear, see, or read. Therefore, 
the American Convention rejects 
resort to justifications such as “na-
tional security”, “morality”, or 
“good habits” that could easily be 
used as pretexts to eliminate or en-
croach upon the free expression of 
ideas. In the Western Hemisphere, 
both the Court and the Commis-
sion have had the opportunity to 
interpret the prohibition of prior 
censorship including: (a) the exclu-
sion of the defense of honor as a 
basis for prior censorship; and (b) 
identifying the scope of authorized 
exceptions.
1. Exclusion of Defense of 
Honor as a Basis for Prior 
Censorship
Some state parties have used the 
right to privacy found in Article 
11 of the Convention78 as a basis 
for restricting the right to freedom 
of expression protected in Article 
13. The basis of their argument is 
that defense of honor should be ex-
cluded from the prior censorship 
prohibition. The state of Chile, for 
example, set forth this argument 
in Martorell v. Chile. The Chilean 
government and judiciary main-
tained that in the event of a conflict 
between Articles 11 (right to priva-
cy) and 13 (right to freedom of ex-
pression) of the American Conven-
tion, the former must prevail.79 In 
deciding the case, the Commission 
rejected this theory and advanced 
its interpretation that the rights in-
cluded in those two articles of the 
American Convention do not pres-
ent a conflict of different principles 
from which one must be chosen.80 
Accordingly, the Commission 
quoted the European Court on 
Human Rights, which, in a similar 
case, considered that it was “faced 
not with a choice between con-
flicting principles, one of which is 
freedom of expression, but with a 
principle of freedom of expression 
that is subject to a number of ex-
ceptions which must be narrowly 
interpreted.”81
The Commission reiterated this 
interpretation of Article 13 in its 
arguments in The Last Temptation 
of Christ.82 In that case, the Chilean 
government prohibited the distri-
bution of the film “The Last Temp-
tation of Christ,” arguing it did so to 
protect the “honor and reputation 
of Christ.”83 The Commission, in 
turn, replied that the “honor of 
the individual should be protect-
ed without prejudicing the exer-
cise of freedom of expression and 
the right to receive information.”84 
The Commission argued subse-
quent liability is “only admissible 
in a restricted way, when necessary 
to ensure respect for the rights or 
reputation of others.”85 In decid-
ing the case, the Court upheld the 
Commission’s reasoning and stated 
the prohibition of the movie The 
Last Temptation of Christ constitut-
ed prior censorship in violation of 
Article 13 of the Convention.86
The Special Rapporteur acknowl-
edged this interpretation in the 
1998 report, noting that States 
must respect the right to freedom 
of expression when legislating the 
protection of honor and dignity 
contained in Article 11 of the Con-
vention and applying domestic law 
on the subject.87
2. Scope of Authorized 
Exceptions
The American Convention autho-
rizes an exception to its prohibition 
of prior censorship: censorship of 
public entertainment for the exclu-
sive purpose of regulating access 
to such events to protect the mor-
als of children and adolescents.88 
This exception, however, is only 
permitted within the framework 
of the Inter-American System if it 
conforms to the requirements of:
• Legality: the exception must be 
authorized by law; decrees or 
other administrative measures 
would be insufficient.
• Necessity: implies a case-by-case 
evaluation of the pertinence 
of the measure, taking into ac-
“One of the principal 
characteristics of the right 
of freedom of expression in 
the Inter-American System is 
that it only allows for prior 
censorship when used to 
regulate public entertainment 
in order to safeguard the 
morals of children and 
adolescents.”
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count the peculiarities of each 
situation, and the lack of less 
restrictive means available to 
achieve the same valid purposes 
in order to exclude improper-
ly-motivated prohibitions.
• Reality or Imminence: measu-
res may be adopted in light of 
actually existing conditions or 
those that are certain to occur, 
not mere hypothetical situa-
tions that could affect the morals 
of children or adolescents (in 
public entertainments).
• Valid Purpose: corresponds to 
cases involving children where 
protection of morals is at issue.89
C. Subsequent Liability
The Inter-American System’s pro-
hibition on prior censorship does 
not exclude subsequent imposition 
of liability. But when sucht liabil-
ity is disproportionate, it effective-
ly “gags” individuals who are faced 
with the threat of serious “retalia-
tion” for expressing their opinions, 
producing a chilling effect for so-
ciety at large. The American Con-
vention sets forth specific require-
ments to establish the validity of 
subsequent liability. These require-
ments have been reflected in the 
jurisprudence of the Court.
One case in which the Court ad-
dressed subsequent liability is 
Kimel v. Argentina.90 Kimel is an 
investigative historian who pub-
lished a book entitled La Masacre 
de San Patricio in 1989.91 The book 
analyzed the killings of five cler-
gymen of the Palotine Order that 
occurred 4 July 1976 during the 
military dictatorship in Argenti-
na.92 Kimel examined the judicial 
investigation into the massacre 
and referred to a judicial decision 
adopted on 7 October 1977.93 He 
raised questions concerning the 
behavior of the federal judge in 
charge of this case, alleging that 
the judge complied with formal 
requirements, but because of pres-
sure from the military regime, had 
not investigated the truth.94
The judge brought a criminal action 
against Kimel for defamation or al-
ternatively for “false imputation of 
a publicly actionable crime,” both 
of which are punishable by up to 
three years in prison according to 
Argentine Criminal Code.95 Kimel 
was found guilty of the latter and 
sentenced on 25 September 1995 
to one year in prison and payment 
of 20,000 pesos96 The Court found 
that the sentence violated the right 
to freedom of thought and expres-
sion laid down by the American 
Convention.97 On the basis of 
Kimel, and some other court deci-
sions, the following requirements 







6. differentiation between opinions 
based on facts and value judgments;
7. preclusion of liability for repro-
duction of information; and
8. strict regulation of contempt 
laws.
These requirements protect the 
right to freedom of expression in 
general, including, “those [forms of 
expression] that offend, shock or 
disturb the majority.”98
Moreover, in applying these require-
ments in a given case, special consid-
eration must be given to protected 
speech including, (a) political speech 
and speech involving matters of pub-
lic interest; (b) speech regarding pub-
lic officials in the exercise of their 
duties and candidates for public of-
fice; and (c) speech that is an element 
of the identity or personal dignity of 
the person expressing herself.99 This 
type of speech is essential for democ-
racy, and accordingly must be sub-
ject to rigorous scrutiny.
Unfortunately, in the 2017 Re-
port by the Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Expression, crimi-
nal statutes in some countries still 
criminalize speech related to public 
officials and allow for the imposi-
tion of un-proportional measures 
“that can have the kind of chilling 
effect that is incompatible with a 
democratic society.”100
“The Inter-American System’s 
prohibition on prior censorship 
does not exclude subsequent 
imposition of liability. 
But when sucht liability is 
disproportionate, it effectively 
“gags” individuals who are 
faced with the threat of serious 
“retaliation” for expressing 
their opinions, producing a 
chilling effect for society at 
large.”
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D. The Right to Access 
Information
The right to access information is 
fundamental to the ongoing devel-
opment of democracy. It is found 
in subsection one of Article 13 of 
the American Convention, which 
provides that the right to freedom 
of expression includes the freedom 
to seek out and receive information 
of all kinds.101
With respect to this issue, the 
Court has noted “a society that is 
not well informed is not a society 
that is truly free.”102 Restrictions 
on access to information held by 
public or private institutions (e.g., 
credit institutions) must be “judged 
by reference to the legitimate needs 
of democratic societies and institu-
tions.”103 This implies the existence 
of an absolute prohibition on ac-
cess to information is incompatible 
with the American Convention. 
Although exceptions and limited 
restrictions are possible (e.g., for 
national security reasons), they 
should be narrowly interpreted 
and subject to judicial review in all 
cases.
E. Right of Correction and Reply
Having established freedom of ex-
pression and thought in Article 13, 
the American Convention provides 
for a right of correction and reply 
in Article 14.104 In Advisory Opin-
ion OC-07/86, the Court asserted 
that these articles are inescapably 
related: “in regulating the applica-
tion of the right of reply or correc-
tion, the States parties must respect 
the right of freedom of expression 
guaranteed by Article 13. They 
may not, however, interpret the 
right of freedom of expression so 
broadly as to negate the right of re-
ply proclaimed by Article 14(1).”105
The Court added that the right to 
reply guarantees respect for free-
dom of expression in both its in-
dividual and shared dimensions. 
In the individual dimension, the 
Court recognizes that this right 
“guarantees that a party injured by 
inaccurate or offensive statements 
has the opportunity to express his 
[or her] views and thoughts about 
the injurious statements.”106 The 
Court further recognized this right 
gives every person “the benefit of 
new information that contradicts 
or disagrees with the previous inac-
curate or offensive statements.”107 
In this respect, the rights act as a 
balance of information which is 
needed for the public to form a 
true and correct opinion.
F. Emergency Situations and 
Their Impact on Freedom of 
Expression
The regulation of emergency sit-
uations is of great importance to 
the protection of rights in general 
and to the protection of freedom of 
expression in particular. Emergen-
cy situations arise when there is a 
threat against the life of the nation. 
These situations permit restric-
tions on human rights, including 
the right to freedom of expression.
The requirements prescribed by 
the American Convention for the 
timely suspension of rights, includ-
ing freedom of expression, are:
1. necessity, there must be absolute-
ly no other possible alternatives in 
the case at hand;
2. timeliness, the suspension of 
rights must be valid strictly for the 
time required;
3. proportionality, measures adopt-
ed cannot be an excessive reaction 
on the part of the authorities in 
light of the existing emergency;
4. compatibility, measures adopted 
must be compatible with other du-
ties imposed by international law;
5. non-discrimination; and
6. compliance with the law by the 
authorities.
The temporary suspension of 
rights supposes actions by author-
ities consistent with the law de-
clared for reasons of general inter-
est and for the purpose for which 
they were established.108
G. The Link Between Freedom 
of Expression and Democracy
Both the Court and the Commis-
sion have established that there is 
an inherent link between freedom 
of expression and democracy.109 In 
Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the 
Court affirmed that “[f]reedom of 
expression is a cornerstone upon 
which the very existence of a dem-
ocratic society rests,”110 and this 
freedom is essential for the devel-
opment of political parties, trade 
unions, scientific and cultural soci-
eties, and those who wish to influ-
ence the public.111
As stated by the Special Rappor-
teur, when debate is restricted, the 
development of democracy is inter-
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rupted because the free debate of 
ideas and opinion among citizens is 
impeded.112 The link between free-
dom of expression and democracy 
has been part of the development 
process within the context of the 
OAS. Currently, only democrat-
ic States may become members 
of that Organization. An import-
ant milestone in this process was 
reached when OAS Resolution 
1080 was adopted in Santiago, 
Chile in 1991.113 It allows OAS 
political organs to take active mea-
sures, including diplomatic initia-
tives, when the constitutional pro-
cess of a country breaks down.114 
The Inter-American Democratic 
Charter broadens the scope of sit-
uations that would warrant OAS 
actions,115 referring specifically to 
freedom of expression. It was built 
on the jurisprudence cited above 
and determined that democracy 
provides the theoretical and practi-
cal ground to guarantee freedom of 
information, as a necessary struc-
ture to secure compliance with hu-
man rights.116
Conclusion
The interpretations of the Ameri-
can Convention by the Court and 
the Commission have developed a 
normative framework designed to 
protect freedom of expression in 
the Inter-American System. This 
framework addresses not only di-
rect but also indirect attacks on the 
right to freedom of expression, in-
cluding protections for speech crit-
icizing public officials, restrictions 
on prior censorship, and positive 
obligations on countries to elimi-
nate media monopolies and ensure 
a friendly environment for the dis-
semination of all ideas in any medi-
um desired.
New forms of media and the rapid 
dissemination of information have 
created new challenges for states 
to grapple with, especially related 
to protection of privacy and new 
forms of corruption. These chal-
lenges make protecting the right 
to freedom of expression even 
more critical to ensure the protec-
tion of other fundamental rights. 
Achieving full protection of the 
right to freedom of expression in 
the Americas requires that states 
fully comply with existing regional 
norms and incorporate them into 
domestic law. As the most recent 
report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Freedom of Expression 
shows, there is much room for im-
provement defending and protect-
ing this right. Because of the nature 
of litigation in the Inter-American 
System, its jurisprudence consists 
of reactions to alleged violations 
of the right to freedom of expres-
sion rather than proactive steps to 
promote the right. That being said, 
promotional steps are essential for 
the full realization of this right, 
especially concerning the right of 
freedom of expression of women, 
LGTBQ persons, and indigenous 
peoples, among others. Affirmative 
steps at the state level seem to be a 
requirement in order to ensure the 
ability of all persons to exercise the 
right to freedom of expression.
Exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression is interwoven into the 
fabric of democracy and underpins 
the relationship between human 
rights and democracy. The inabil-
ity to fully exercise the right to 
freedom of expression, jeopardizes 
the ability to exercise every other 
human right and removes the dem-
ocratic power from the people.
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Human Rights Treaty Bodies for a 
one-year term in 2013.
Professor Grossman has served as 
President of the Inter-American 
Institute of Human Rights since 
2014, following three years on its 
Board of Directors;as well as the 
boards of the Robert F. Kenne-
dy Center for Justice & Human 
Rights, the Governing Board of the 
International Association of Law 
Schools, the American Bar Associ-
ation’s Rule of Law Initiative, and 
the Open Society Justice Initiative 
of Open Society Foundations.
He also served as President of the 
College of the Americas (COL-
AM), an organization of approx-
imately 400 colleges and univer-
sities in the Western Hemisphere 
(November 2003-November 2007); 
Chair of the Committee on Inter-
national Cooperation of the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools 
(November 2005-November 2009); 
and as a member of the Commis-
sion for the Control of Interpol’s 
Files (February 2005-March 2011).
In addition, he was a member of 
the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) from 
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1993-2001. He was twice elected its 
President, first in 1996 and again 
in 2001. He was the IACHR’s first 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Women (1996-2000), as well 
as its Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Populations 
(2000-2001), and its Observer of 
the AMIA Trial (2001-2005). Rep-
resenting the IACHR,
Professor Grossman participat-
ed in missions to Argentina, Bra-
zil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, 
and Peru, among others. On behalf 
of international and non-govern-
mental organizations, he has also 
chaired or participated in missions 
to observe elections in Nepal, Nic-
aragua, Paraguay, Romania, Su-
rinam, and the Middle East. Pro-
fessor Grossman is the author of 
numerous publications regarding 
international law and human rights 
and the recipient of numerous 
awards for his work in those fields.
